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A B S T R A C T   
The provision of public goods plays a key role in the survival of leaders in democracies. Assuming that mass rail 
transport shares many of the characteristics of public goods, we claim that the public provision of railway ser-
vices is more beneficial for political leaders in democracies than private provision. To estimate the effect of the 
type of provision of railway services on leader survival, we use new data on four European democracies that 
present variation in the public and private ownership of rail miles between 1913 and 1981. We find that the 
private provision of rail transport increases the hazard rates of leader deposition in these democracies. These 
results bear crucial implications, as they help to explain the sweeping policies of nationalization of public ser-
vices that took place in the first half of the 20th Century in Western Europe.   
1. Introduction 
The regulation and provision of railroads are frequently addressed 
from an economic perspective to assess efficiency (e.g., Amaral, 2008; 
Bougna & Crozet, 2016; Waters, 2007). Yet, the provision of goods and 
services can also be crucial for political motives, namely to gain political 
support from citizens. While the majority of studies on leader survival 
agrees that democratic regimes generally tend to provide more public 
goods for reasons of political survival (see Bueno de Mesquita et al., 
2003; Deacon, 2009; Lake & Baum, 2001; McGuire and Olson 1996), 
there is limited empirical evidence about particular types of goods 
provided and whether they can be associated with duration in office. 
Previous research uncovers a positive effect for some types of public 
goods in democracies such as economic growth, victory in war, or even 
air quality (see, e.g. Goemans, 2008; McGillivray & Smith, 2008; Quiroz 
Flores, 2012; Clark et al., 2013).1 Although democracies are also asso-
ciated with a higher public good provision in infrastructure (Roessler, 
2019; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003), the impact of the type of provision 
of infrastructural goods and services on political survival in democracies 
has not yet been scrutinized. 
In this paper, we close this research gap and examine the effect of the 
share of privately-owned railway mileage on democratic leader survival. 
The provision of mass transport by the government is one of the 
infrastructure-related goods and services that should increase tenure in 
office (e.g., Bueno de Mesquita & Smith, 2009). Building upon previous 
theoretical work, we test whether the public provision of infrastructural 
goods like railways exerts a positive effect on political survival: due to its 
positive effect on an economy’s productivity (McGuire and Olson 1996) 
and a citizen’s level of consumption, it generates loyalty and political 
support of a large share of the population in exchange (Bueno De Mes-
quita et al. 2003; Deacon, 2009). Therefore, we expect a larger share of 
privately-owned railway infrastructure to increase the hazard rates of 
leaders in large coalition systems because it reduces the general welfare 
of supporters (e.g., Preston & Robins, 2013), thus fueling their in-
centives to replace the incumbent with a challenger. 
We test our theoretical argument with a new sample of manually 
collected data of the ownership of rail transport in four European de-
mocracies between 1913 and 1981. This small sample is characterized 
by a large cross-country and within-country variation on how this 
‘public good’ is provided.2 For instance, in Germany, Austria, and 
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Belgium, there have been both public and private companies operating 
at the same time, although across different lines. In France, the rail 
network has been a public-private hybrid for most of the 20th Century. 
Estimating duration models with a probit link, we find supporting evi-
dence that the private provision of rail mileage increases leaders’ hazard 
rates. This result is robust to the use of alternative rail mileage data from 
the late 19th Century (Bogart, 2009). 
We contribute to earlier studies in several aspects. Using disaggre-
gate data on railway mileage ownership, we provide the first systematic 
analysis of the effect of an additional aspect of ‘public goods’, i.e. 
infrastructure, on political survival. In doing so, we extend previous 
studies on the effect of particular goods on political survival (e.g., Bell, 
2011; Clark et al., 2013; Quiroz Flores, 2012; Lucas and Richter, 2016). 
While the variation in ownership of rail networks has been explored by 
several researchers and numerous case studies (e.g., Bogart, 2009; 
Dougall, 1939; Kasraian et al., 2016; Millward, 1995; Veenendaal, 
1995), our paper is the first to combine the provision of infrastructural 
goods and services as proxied by railway network mileage with theories 
of political survival. Also, this paper sheds more lights into the sweeping 
policies of nationalization of public services in the first half of the 20th 
Century in Western Europe. While media occasionally link the question 
of private or public provision with potential electoral outcomes (e.g., in 
the course of the general election in the UK in June 2017), we contribute 
by exploring whether the public or private provision of rail mileage 
affects a democratic leaders’ tenure in office. 
Our paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents the theoretical 
framework of ownership of railway mileage provided. Section 3 pro-
vides an overview over our research design including a description of 
the new railway ownership data which are used for our empirical 
analysis in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 concludes. 
2. Political survival, public goods, and the provision of rail 
transport 
In this section, we explain how the type of provision of railways is 
linked to tenure in office in democracies. Our argument that public 
provision of rail transport is survival-enhancing is based on the 
assumption that political leaders’ primary goal is to maximize tenure in 
office (Bell, 2011; Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003; Downs, 1957). In 
exchange for political support, democratic leaders are more likely to 
provide public goods (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003; Deacon, 2009; 
Lake & Baum, 2001). 
Whether citizens support the government in exchange for policies 
depends on the positive effect of policies and distribution of goods on 
individuals’ net income and consumption. Increasing support is reached 
by providing a utility-maximizing mixture of both public and private 
goods to key supporters (e.g., Burstein, 2003). In Selectorate Theory, the 
so-called ‘winning coalition’ (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003), whose 
loyalty is needed for political survival, is larger in democracies. In this 
case, it is more effective to provide relatively more public goods such as 
infrastructure in exchange for political support (Deacon, 2009; Bueno de 
Mesquita et al. 2003; Lake & Baum, 2001).3 This relationship between 
investment in public infrastructure and higher chances of re-election 
and promotion is supported by earlier studies (Cadot et al., 2006; 
Huet-Vaughn & Emiliano, 2019; Lei & Zhou, 2020). The provision of 
public goods, however, only generates a survival-enhancing effect for 
politicians if the increase in an individual’s consumption from beneficial 
publicly provided goods is not outweighed by costs resulting from an 
increased tax burden needed to finance public goods provision (see 
Roessler, 2019). 
Public goods can take many shapes, including national security, 
infrastructure, and communications that increase productivity and 
facilitate mobilization (e.g., Bueno de Mesquita & Smith, 2009; Bueno 
de M esquita et al., 2003; Roessler, 2019). Along these lines, rail net-
works share public goods qualities as they can contribute to national 
security and have spillover effects on economic development, poten-
tially more than unproductive rental transfers would (see Plümper & 
Martin, 2003). An expanded railway network and reduced transport 
costs have been found to encourage regional development and benefit 
citizens (e.g., Herranz-Loncán & Fourie, 2017; Donaldson & Hornbeck, 
2016; Redding & Turner, 2015; Pradhan & Bagchi, 2013; Car-
uana-Galizia & Martí-Henneberg, 2013). 
We argue that the public provision of railway mileage generates a 
survival-enhancing effect for politicians by presenting political oppor-
tunities which are not available if railway infrastructure is privately 
provided. Primarily, the public provision of railway transport allows 
democratic leaders to increase individual consumption and fulfill their 
mobility needs by providing more or improved access to rail services at 
lower fares. Heavily subsidized railways such as the Belgian railways 
SNCB provide predominantly passenger services (Oum & Yu, 1994, p. 
125f) at considerably lower costs for the individual consumer. This 
supported by studies reporting higher average fares, overcrowding 
problems, and a decline in punctuality after rail privatization (e.g., 
Parker, 2013; Jupe, 2010; Mees, 2005; Mizutani, 1999, p. 124).4 
Also, railways, which largely depends on public subsidies, can 
operate less efficiently than private providers (Oum & Yu, 1994, p. 136) 
and cover unremunerative routes to the benefit of small, isolated com-
munities that may not have rail access otherwise.5 Public provision thus 
facilitates the clientelist allocation of resources, which is expected to 
increase voters’ support of a political leader in the short-term (e.g. 
Boycko et al., 1996) but may be more economically inefficient (e.g. 
Amaral, 2008; Boardman & Aidan, 1989; Bogart, 2010; Caves & Chris-
tensen, 1980). 
There are two additional political opportunities in the public provi-
sion of mass transport. First, and considering the macro-level, the public 
provision of railway can increase a citizen’s welfare due to its positive 
effect in public sector employment. The government’s budget allows 
political leaders to have more resources than private companies in order 
to create jobs in the railway sector, i.e. to employ much more workers, 
who as voters play important political roles depending on the electoral 
and party systems in question (McGillivray, 2004; Helland & Sørensen, 
2009).6 Second, an increase in wages is likely to be found before elec-
tions in public enterprises (Matschke, 2003, p. 108). 
Private provision of railway transport, in contrast, is unlikely to offer 
comparable individual benefits. Due to the rent-maximizing incentives 
of private companies, production and operating costs tend to be lower 
and efficiency higher (e.g., Oum & Yu, 1994; Villalonga, 2000; Vining & 
Boardman, 1992). Thus, previous research suggests that private firms 
can produce and provide public services successfully under certain 
conditions (Andreoni & Bergstrom, 1996; Bagnoli & Lipman, 1992; 
Lindsay & Dougan, 2013; Montgomery & Richard, 1999; Roberts, 1992; 
Tabarrok, 1998). Yet, the track record of private rail infrastructure has 
3 This tendency to provide more public goods (e.g., Bausch, 2014; Bell, 2011; 
Deacon, 2009; Roessler, 2019) and performing better with the provision of 
public goods (e.g., Adam et al., 2011; Cao & Ward, 2015) has been discussed in 
previous work on public goods provision and political institutions. 
4 In an econometric simulation of the counterfactual public infrastructure, 
Preston and Robins (2013) find that fares are lower and services are better 
when privately provided. According to the authors, however, these welfare 
gains have been offset by increases in costs for infrastructure and operation. 
5 In the long-run, affordable prices may come at the expense of quality ser-
vices, the creation of enormous debt, and eventually lead to unpopular policies 
on railway cuts with adverse electoral outcomes, as demonstrated by the 
Beeching Cuts in the British General Election of 1964 (Quiroz Flores & Paul, 
2018).  
6 See, for instance, Boycko et al. (1996) who model political incentives of 
politicians for excess employment in public enterprises. This excess employ-
ment is reduced when restructuring towards private provision (Boycko et al., 
1996; Martin & Parker, 1997). 
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been mixed at best, particularly in England. By the end of the 19th 
Century, there were more than 120 unregulated rail companies oper-
ating redundant and, for instance in the case of Hatfield in October 
2000, even dangerous lines (Evans, 2013). Eventually, the British gov-
ernment forced these companies to consolidate in order to improve 
passenger safety and facilitate oversight.7 In response to similar prob-
lems, the same policy of consolidation was implemented in France and 
Ireland as well. 
In sum, we argue that voters will face poorer access to transport - in 
terms of service, coverage, prices, or maintenance - under private pro-
viders than under public ones. More importantly, as private provision is 
associated with lower overall benefits for political supporters, this is 
expected to increase their incentives to replace the incumbent with a 
challenger. In the following, we thus test our hypothesis that the higher 
the share of private provision of rail transport, the higher the hazard rate of 
political leaders in democratic regimes. 
3. Data and empirical approach 
3.1. Sample 
In line with previous empirical work on leader survival (e.g., Bueno 
de Mesquita et al. 2003), our unit of analysis is the country-year-leader 
level. Our sample is defined by cases that meet two conditions. First, the 
country should be democratic. Second, there should be variation in the 
share of private provision of rail transport over time. 
Regarding the first criterion, a democratic period takes place if a 
standardized version of the Polity IV Polity score - ranging from zero 
(perfect autocracy) to one (perfect democracy) - is not missing and is 
larger or equal than 0.75. In our estimation sample, the standardized 
Polity score ranges between 0.8 and 1, while the size of the winning 
coalition, as measured by Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003), ranges from 
0.75 to 1. 
With respect to the second criterion, four countries in Europe present 
significant variation in the share of private provision of rail transport in 
our historical period of interest of 1913–1981: Austria, Belgium, France, 
and Germany. We did not include Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and the 
United Kingdom because rail transport was provided exclusively by 
private firms which were then fully nationalized. Likewise, we did not 
include the Netherlands because rail provision was mostly public. While 
these cases are undoubtedly interesting, they cannot offer insights in the 
context of our research question. Unfortunately, collecting data for other 
European countries during this historical period was beyond our re-
sources. Having said this, our sample includes the democratic periods of 
Austria, Belgium, France, and Germany between 1913 and 1981. In a 
complementary model, we use Bogart’s historical dataset of rail na-
tionalizations (2009) in order to extend our period of coverage to the 
years 1871–1981. 
We note that most of the observations in our estimation samples 
correspond to Belgium and France. As we will explain in the following 
subsection, this is caused by the large number of leader changes that 
take place in these two countries. In contrast, leadership is more stable 
in Austria and Germany during our period of interest and therefore these 
countries tend to contribute fewer observations to our estimation sam-
ples. In understanding why leaders stay in office longer than others, we 
indirectly explain why there are more leader changes in some countries 
than in others. 
3.2. Dependent variable 
Our dependent variable Leader Fails is equal to zero if a leader is in 
office and equal to one when they lose office. We use leader data from 
Archigos, a database of political leaders collected by Goemans et al. 
(2009). In our estimation sample there are 65 leaders: 52 were deposed 
and 13 are right-censored. We include a cubic polynomial of a leader’s 
tenure in office as a measure of time dependence (Carter and Signorino 
2010). 
Our estimation sample includes two democratic leaders with 
exceptionally long tenure in office: Chancellor Julius Raab in Austria 
and Chancellor Konrad Adenauer in Germany. Raab was in office for 97 
months or approximately eight years, while Adenauer was in office for 
88 months or over seven years in office. This is similar to the tenure of 
the longest serving politician in Bueno de Mesquita et al.‘s (2003) Hall of 
Fame of democratic leaders, the Japanese Prime Minister Sato with a 
tenure of 7.7 years. 
However, Raab and Adenauer are exceptions in our sample. Indeed, 
the median tenure of leaders in our data is 12 months. While leaders in 
large coalition systems tend to stay in office for short periods of time 
relative to their counterparts in small coalition systems (Bueno de 
Mesquita et al. 2003), this can be considered as a comparatively short 
spell in office. For instance, the third longest serving leader in our 
sample of 65 leaders is French Minister Georges Clemencau with a 
tenure of 27 months or just over two years in office. 
The short tenure of leaders in our sample is mostly driven by the 
unstable political systems in France and Belgium. For instance, Austria 
contributes four leaders to our estimation sample while Germany con-
tributes eight leaders. In contrast, Belgium contributes with 23 leaders 
and France with 30 leaders. Indeed, there are multiple leaders during the 
same year in each country and this is quite pronounced in France and 
Belgium, which explains why a large number of observations in our 
sample corresponds to these two nations. 
3.3. Independent variable 
For the purpose of this analysis, we manually collected data on rail 
mileage owned by private firms which was set in relation to total rail 
mileage to construct the share (Private Mileage Ratio) in Austria, 
Belgium, France, and Germany between 1913 and 1981. The recent 
years of this data have been collected from the printed versions of the 
Stateman’s Yearbooks (Palgrave Macmillan, 1922–1983). Our database 
complements Bogart’s historical dataset of rail network nationalization 
(2009). 
The variable can take values from zero to one with higher values 
representing a larger share of private railway services. Private Mileage 
Ratio ranges between zero and 0.783 in our sample. As the length of 
democratic periods has varied across countries, and due to multiple 
leader changes in particular years, the number of observations per 
country is not equally distributed within our sample. Also, private 
mileage ratio differs across countries; the mean private mileage ratio is 
0.26 with a variance of 0.35. Austria’s private mileage ratio, for 
instance, varied from 0.32 in 1920 to very low private provision in the 
1970s, which increased slightly to a ratio of 0.09 in 1981. 8 France, in 
contrast, presents very high levels of private mileage ratio for the entire 
observation period. 
The majority of our observations correspond to the so-called stabi-
lization period of national railway networks, which took place between 
1910 and 1960 (Martí-Henneberg & Jordi, 2013). We also cover part of 
the period of reduction of the networks (1960–2010). The period of 
stabilization is particularly important because most countries consoli-
dated and reorganized the structure of their rail network, which led to a 
very interesting mix of public and private provision of rail transport. 
7 See Nash and Smith (2020) or Preston (2008) for a more detailed historical 
overview of public transport procurement in Britain. 
8 During and shortly after WWII, railway mileage has been in public hands. 
Unfortunately, missing values in our primary sources for Private Mileage Ratio 
exist, especially during war periods. As a result, data is best illustrated with 
gaps (see Fig. 1). Regardless, data covers a large number of country-year- 
leaders, which is our unit of analysis. 
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For instance, some countries that had large participation of private 
firms ended up with a publicly operated network, most notably the UK. 
In other countries, private providers remained active well over the 
second half of the 20th century such as in Belgium and Austria (Aydin & 
Dzhaleva-Chonkova, 2013), although some of these private firms were 
gradually nationalized. In the Netherlands, rail transport was provided 
almost exclusively by private firms. Rail provision in France lies some-
where in the middle. With the exceptions of the government-operated 
Etat and Alsace-Lorraine lines, the country relied mostly on private 
concessions until the late 1930s, when a new legal and financial 
framework kept the network privately operated but controlled by Paris 
(Dougall, 1939). As illustrated in Fig. 1, this is reflected by a relatively 
high private mileage ratio compared to other European democracies of 
our sample. 
This empirical analysis presented here necessarily requires variation 
in private mileage ratio. As mentioned before, our sample covers both the 
stabilization and reduction period of rail networks, which offer both 
cross- and within-country variation in the structure of the networks. This 
variation is the result of a tension between leaders’ political incentives 
to remain in office and the ‘sticky’ nature of the initial mix of public- 
private provision of rail transport. Research in political survival 
(Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003) indicates that leaders do find the in-
centives and political opportunities to overcome the persistent nature of 
institutions and shape them to strengthen their hold in office. We find 
that this is the case in the changing ownership of rail networks in the 
countries and periods we cover. While this opens the possibility of 
endogeneity in the private mileage ratio, we effectively use an instru-
mental variable approach –described in the next section– to tackle this 
particular challenge. 
3.4. Control variables 
We control of additional determinants of leaders’ tenure in office 
suggested in the literature (e.g., Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Goe-
mans, 2008; McGillivray & Smith, 2008; Bueno de Mesquita & Smith, 
2009; Escribà-Folch & Abel, 2013; Licht, 2010; Wright et al., 2015). In a 
first instance, we include percent change in government’s expenditure 
per capita (Δ(Expenditure pc)) as an additional measure of public goods 
provision. For robustness, supplementary models used historical GDP 
per capita data from the Maddison Project (Bolt et al., 2018) as an 
alternative measure of public goods. As a third alternative proxy test, we 
have estimated supplementary models that replace changes in govern-
ment’s expenditure per capita with levels of expenditure per capita (c.f. 
Table A4 and Table A5 in the appendix). 
In addition, and although there is a lack of variation in political and 
electoral institutions across the four countries in our sample and over 
time, we account for multiple sources of political and social conflict 
captured by the natural logarithm of Banks & Wilson’s (2016) weighted 
conflict index, which includes several types of domestic dissent such as 
demonstrations and riots (ln(Conflict)). 
In terms of further rail provision, we account for rail density as a 
measure of rail coverage.9 This is given by the natural logarithm of all 
railroad mileage per square mile (ln(Rail Sq Mile)). We also include the 
natural logarithm of population density (ln (Population Density)) as this 
is both related to rail coverage and the difficulties in providing public 
goods to the rural population. 
All these variables were obtained from the Cross-National Time-Se-
ries (CNTS) Data Archive (Banks & Wilson, 2016), which has a longer 
coverage of key determinants of tenure in office than the typical mea-
sures based on World Bank indicators used elsewhere (e.g., Bueno de 
Mesquita & Smith, 2010). The CNTS also offers a measure of GDP per 
capita, which is the indicator of public goods traditionally used by 
studies of political survival. However, it only covers the years after 
1936. For this reason, we relied on government’s expenditure per capita 
or on the measurement of GDP per capita from the Maddison project. 
They both covers the countries in our sample from 1861 to 1871 
respectively. Summary statistics for all variables included in the baseline 
model are presented in Table 1. 
3.5. Estimation approach 
We estimate four discrete duration models with a probit link (Beck 
et al., 1998; Carter & Curtis, 2010) where the dependent variable is 
Leader Fails. Model 1 includes Private Mileage Ratio, Δ(Expenditure pc), ln 
(Rail Sq Mile), ln(Conflict), and ln(Population Density) as covariates. 
Model 2 uses one-year lags of these variables as covariates. Model 3 uses 
the same specification of Model 2 but complements our sample with 
Bogart’s historical dataset of rail nationalizations (2009), thus extending 
our period of coverage to the years 1871–1981. As the variable ln 
(Conflict) is not available for this entire period, it has been omitted in 
model 3. Standard errors in all our models are clustered at the leader 
level to account for a potential lack of independence across 
observations. 
As private mileage provision might be endogenous to leader survival, 
we therefore use a probit link with instrumental variables (Newey, 
1987). More specifically, Model 4 includes the same specification of 
Model 1 and uses the number of passenger cars as an instrument of 
Private Mileage Ratio. For our sample of Model 4, the mean of passenger 
cars is 1160.32 with a standard deviation of 877.14. Generally, a valid 
Fig. 1. Private mileage ratio in Austria, Belgium, Germany, and 
France, 1913–1981 
Table 1 
Descriptive statistics.  
Variable Obs Mean SD Min Max 
Leader Failure 129 0.40 0.49 0 1 
Months in office 129 25.43 28.53 1 141 
Private Mileage Ratio 129 0.26 0.35 0 0.78 
Austria 21 0.05 0.05 0 0.10 
Belgium 58 0.02 0.03 0 0.06 
France 40 0.77 0.02 0.71 0.78 
Germany 8 0.07 0.01 0.06 0.08 
Germany FR 2 0.16 0.00 0.16 0.17 
Expenditure p.c. 129 8.59 28.51 − 46.35 208.23 
ln (Rail Mileage) 129 7.53 0.45 7.11 8.66 
ln (Conflict) 129 5.65 2.84 0 9.87 
ln (Population density) 129 8.26 0.63 7.53 9.01  
9 While citizens’ preferences for provision of railway and spending is likely to 
depend on their location, available data does not allow to spatially identify 
railway mileage. See Xie and Levinson (2009) for a formal model considering 
spatial factors in transportation infrastructure. 
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instrumental variable must be correlated with the endogenous variable 
and be uncorrelated with the disturbance (Greene, 2018). A valid in-
strument must also meet the exclusion restriction. We believe that our 
instrument meets these three conditions.10 
First, historically, car ownership has been a strong competitor of rail 
travel in general and may have had an impact on demand for the public 
rail networks as service deteriorated and public debt increased. Second, 
the decision to purchase a car is mostly private and we assume that 
leaders do not have neither the political incentives nor the capacity to 
interfere with the private decision to purchase a car. We believe that this 
decreases any correlation between car passengers and the disturbance, 
thus reducing the probability of endogeneity. Lastly, we do not expect 
that the number of passenger cars will have a direct effect on the 
probability of leader deposition. While the development of the infra-
structure for car travel may have an effect on leader survival, the utili-
zation of this infrastructure and the purchase of cars by individuals is 
unlikely to determine a leader’s prospects of staying in office.11 
4. Empirical findings 
Estimation results in Table 2 indicate that the private provision of 
rail transport increases the probability of leader deposition as the co-
efficients for Private Mileage Ratio and Private Mileage Ratiot-1 across 
models are positive and significant. This is consistent with our hypoth-
esis on the negative effect of the private provision of quasi-public goods. 
Empirical findings of our control variables are consistent with pre-
vious work on political survival (e.g., Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; 
Escribà-Folch & Abel, 2013; Licht, 2010). For instance, the coefficients 
for the cubic polynomial indicate that there is no duration dependence, 
which is consistent with the argument that leaders face a constant 
hazard rate over time due to a weak loyalty norm in large coalition 
systems. Also, similar to Escribà-Folch and Abel (2013), we find that 
conflict increases the likelihood of leader removal reflecting adverse 
effects of political instability. 
In order to illustrate the negative effect of the private provision of rail 
transport on leader survival, Fig. 2 presents the hazard rate of leaders as 
a function of the ratio of private mileage according to the estimation 
results of Model 2 in Table 2, with all other covariates held at their 
medians. Fig. 2 clearly shows that private mileage provision increases 
the probability of leader deposition. This substantive effect is present in 
all four models in Table 2. 
According to Model 2, and holding all covariates at their median, a 
ten per cent increase in the share of rail mileage owned by private firms 
—our Private Mileage Ratio— increases the probability of leader 
deposition in roughly five to six percent points. More specifically and 
taking the 0.262 sample mean in private mileage ratio as a reference, 
Model 2 indicates that an increase in Private Mileage Ratio from 30 per 
cent to 40 per cent increases the probability of leader deposition from 
36.8 per cent to 42.2 per cent, with standard errors of 0.06 and 0.05 
respectively. 
Table 2 
Estimation results (baseline models).  
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Private Mileage Ratio 1.052**   3.030**  
(0.50)   (1.29) 
Private Mileage Ratiot-1  1.385** 0.805*    
(0.58) (0.44)  
Δ(Expenditure pc)  0.002   0.002  
(0.00)   (0.01) 
Δ(Expenditure pc)t-1   − 0.005 − 0.003    
(0.01) (0.01)  
ln (Rail Sq Mile) 0.156   0.247  
(0.32)   (0.33) 
ln (Rail Sq Mile)t-1  0.312 0.230    
(0.40) (0.28)  
ln (Conflict) 0.274***   0.209**  
(0.07)   (0.08) 
ln (Conflict) t-1  0.125**     
(0.06)   
ln (Population Density) − 0.161   0.602  
(0.33)   (0.66) 
ln (Population Density) t-1  0.047 − 0.209    
(0.44) (0.33)  
Months in Office 0.052 − 0.016 − 0.011 0.048  
(0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) 
Months in Office2 − 0.001 0.001 0.000 − 0.000  
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Months in Office3 0.000 − 0.000 − 0.000 0.000  
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Constant − 2.688 − 4.165 − 0.557 − 9.901*  
(2.08) (3.06) (2.48) (5.26)  
Ath ρ    − 0.477     
(0.31) 
ln σ    − 1.77***     
(0.10) 
Observations 129 116 249 125 
Clusters 65 56 109 63 
Log-Likelihood − 68.42 − 65.53 − 153.6 − 20.84 
Notes: Discrete duration models with a probit link where the dependent variable 
is Leader Failure. Unit of analysis is country-leader-year. Model 4 uses an 
instrumental variable probit link model. Wald test for a null of no endogeneity in 
Model 4: (Ath ρ = 0) with χ2(1) = 2.34 and p-value of 0.1258. Significance 
levels: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. 
Fig. 2. Probability of leader deposition (model 2, Table 2).  
10 Testing the validity of an instrument is an imperfect task. In Table A1 and 
A2 in the Appendix we present full results of our two-step instrumental variable 
probit models from Tables 2 and 3. Results include the first stage regression 
which shows that the effect of passenger cars on Private Mileage Ratio is positive 
and highly statistically significant. Our results also suggest that we fail to reject 
the null hypothesis of no endogeneity. However, it is more difficult to show that 
an instrument meets the exclusion restriction. Recent work has shown that valid 
instruments are very unlikely to pass empirical tests of the exclusion restriction 
(Wan, 2018; Deng, 2019), and only under very restrictive conditions can a test 
be implemented (Baiocchi et al., 2014). These conditions are not present in our 
sample. In spite of this, we believe that the use of passenger cars will not have a 
direct effect on leader survival. Additionally, we recognize that there may be 
omitted variables that are correlated with passenger cars in the first stage 
regression. Indeed, a common issue for all quantitative analyses –including our 
own– is that the ‘true’ set of independent variables is unknown or cannot be 
validly quantified (c.f. Neumayer & Plümper, 2017, p. 130ff). While we cannot 
be sure that we have not omitted variables, which necessarily limits our anal-
ysis, we are confident that the instrumental variable approach used here ad-
dresses our main concern of endogeneity.  
11 We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing out the difference between 
the construction and utilization phase of transport infrastructure. 
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The models of Table 2 use changes in government expenditure per 
capita as a measure of public goods provision. As mentioned before, we 
used this variable due to its extensive historical coverage of the countries 
in our sample. While this is an adequate measure of wealth, we sup-
plemented our analyses by replacing government expenditure per capita 
with a measure of GDP per capita in 2011 US Dollars with multiple 
benchmarks as provided by the Maddison Project (Bolt et al., 2018). This 
database provides the longest historical coverage of GDP per capita and 
it has allowed us to extend the number of observations significantly. 
Summary statistics for all covariates for the estimation sample of Model 
1 are available in Table A3 in the Appendix. Table 3 presents estimation 
results; the estimation strategy is identical to the strategy of Table 2. 
These estimation results from Table 3 confirm that increases in the 
private mileage ratio increase the likelihood of leader deposition. 
Indeed, the coefficients for Private Mileage Ratio and Private Mileage 
Ratiot-1 in Models 1 and 2 are positive and significant. As an illustration, 
Model 2 indicates that an increase in Private Mileage Ratio from 30 per 
cent to 40 per cent increases the probability of leader deposition from 
44.1 per cent to 49 per cent, with standard errors of 0.04 and 0.05 
respectively. This type of increase of the probability of deposition is also 
observed in Model 4, our instrumental variable model that relies on the 
number of passenger cars as an instrument of Private Mileage Ratio.12 
It is important to note, however, that the coefficients for Private 
Mileage Ratio in Table 3 are not as large as in Table 2 - extending the 
historical coverage has moderated the magnitude of the effect of the 
private provision of rail transport. This is also evident in Model 3, which 
extends our original data with Bogart’s historical dataset of rail na-
tionalizations (2009). In this case, Private Mileage Ratio is no longer 
significant. 
To sum up, our results generally indicate that a large proportion of 
private rail mileage increases the likelihood of leader deposition. While 
the sample only comprises a small number of countries for a significant 
period of time, our results are robust to different specifications, to the 
use of an instrumental variable as well as to different sources of public 
goods provision. 
Since our estimation sample is restricted to four countries, however, 
we were unable to estimate panel data models that could explore the 
effect of unobserved heterogeneity through fixed or random effects. In 
spite of this, we estimated a random effects probit model for our four 
countries and estimation results showed that the panel level variance 
component was not significant. Moreover, it has been argued that probit 
models cannot be estimated with conditional fixed effects, while un-
conditional fixed effects lead to bias estimates (StataCorp, 2017). Thus, 
we did not estimate fixed effects models. Future work could collect more 
data on countries with significant variation in Private Mileage Ratio, 
which would facilitate the estimation of panel data models. 
5. Discussion: survival-enhancing private provision 
In this research article, we examined whether democratic political 
leaders have a higher likelihood of remaining in office when a larger 
share of railway mileage is provided publicly. Our argument of 
increasing electoral incentives with public provision of railways is 
empirically supported by the analysis. Yet, it appears puzzling at first 
that the same countries that provided mass transport publicly, opted for 
policies of privatization or at least sweeping private provision of railway 
services since the 1980s. 
The 1980s are a natural inflexion point in the analysis of public and 
private provision of services, particularly in the areas of transport and 
communication. At this time, there were sweeping ideological changes 
across the world – as well as large economic shocks– that turned pri-
vatization into a viable political strategy. Explaining and summarizing 
motives for privatization have received large attention in research (e.g., 
Montagnes & Bektemirov, 2018; Clarke & Pistelis, 2005; Bortolotti et al., 
2004; Megginson and Netter 2003; Vickers & Wright, 1989). Amongst 
others, the drive for privatization stemmed from efficiency consider-
ations and political rent-seeking behaviour. Fiscal imbalances and po-
litical uncertainty trigger privatization as windfall revenues can be used 
to serve political purposes in the present (Montagnes & Bektemirov, 
2018; Bortolotti et al., 2004). As a politician’s confidence about 
re-election decreases, it becomes more and more convenient to invest 
less in public assets but privatize (Montagnes & Bektemirov, 2018). In 
other words, it is rational for political leaders to prefer revenues from 
privatization over public provision of railway services if it generates 
higher private rents or electoral incentives than public provision. 
While an empirical analysis of the effect of ownership structure on 
political survival may benefit from data from the 1980s, we believe that 
the forces that made privatization viable in the 1980s make this period 
and subsequent years qualitatively different from the historical stabili-
zation and reduction periods covered in this study. In addition, these 
changes reduced a large proportion of the variation in rail ownership 
that we identified in the period covered by our paper. Against this 
backdrop, our data collection is limited to 1913 to 1981. Nevertheless, 
we believe this is a very useful dataset that will provide a foundation for 
the analysis of subsequent changes in the ownership structure of mass 
transport. 
6. Conclusion 
In this article, we use historical data on the ownership of rail miles in 
four European democracies between 1913 and 1981 to disaggregate the 
provision of public goods and estimate its effect on leaders’ tenure in 
office. Specifically, we argue that the private provision of public goods 
should increase the hazard rates of leaders in large coalition systems 
because it reduces the general welfare of supporters, thus fueling their 
incentives to replace the incumbent with a challenger. Empirical results 
support our theoretical expectation: discrete duration models of leader 
survival suggest that the private provision of rail transport increases the 
probability of leader deposition. 
The evidence that the public provision of railway mileage is bene-
ficial for a political leader helps explain the sweeping policies of 
nationalization of public services in the first half of the 20th Century in 
Western Europe. When private provision is unregulated, chaotic, and 
inefficient, politicians in democratic countries can seize this opportunity 
to take over routes and offer public goods in the form of nationwide rail 
travel at affordable prices in exchange of political support. The evidence 
in this paper indicates that the private provision of rail transport was not 
politically beneficial between 1913 and 1981, which partly explains 
large waves of nationalization. 
This does not mean that the public provision of rail transport is under 
all circumstances financially superior to private provision. As mentioned 
in the theoretical section, there is mixed evidence in terms of the success 
of the public or private provision of mass transport. Our argument 
therefore does not focus on efficiency or long-term viability, but on the 
political opportunities that public provision offers in the short term. As 
elaborated in our discussion, opting for privatization or private-public 
partnerships may be rational under certain circumstances. In order to 
test whether leader survival under privatization differs from survival 
under private-public partnership, further research and data collection 
will necessary, and we hope that future research will undertake such 
endeavor. 
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Appendix  
Table A1 
First and second stage results for model 4 of Table 2.  
Variable Leader Failure (2nd Stage) Private Mileage Ratio (1st stage) 
Private Mileage Ratio 3.030**   
(1.29)  
Passenger Cars  0.0001***   
(0.00) 
Δ(Expenditure pc)  0.002 − 0.003*  
(0.01) (0.00) 
ln (Rail Sq Mile) 0.247 0.178***  
(0.33) (0.06) 
ln (Conflict) 0.209** 0.024**  
(0.08) (0.01) 
ln (Population Density) 0.602 − 0.533***  
(0.66) (0.06) 
(continued on next page) 
Table 3 
Estimation results (including GDP per capita).   
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Private Mileage Ratio 1.270***   2.129**  
(0.452)   (0.836) 
Private Mileage Ratiot-1  1.204*** 0.453    
(0.439) (0.306)  
ln (GDP per capita) − 0.160   0.171  
(0.370)   (0.438) 
ln (GDP per capita) t-1  − 0.591 − 0.164    
(0.381) (0.207)  
ln (Rail Sq Mile) − 0.0164   0.364  
(0.434)   (0.452) 
ln (Rail Sq Mile)t-1  − 0.00203 0.277    
(0.546) (0.285)  
ln (Conflict) 0.221***   0.258***  
(0.0612)   (0.0843) 
ln (Conflict) t-1  0.0729     
(0.0462)   
ln (Population Density) 0.0829   0.0604  
(0.462)   (0.616) 
ln (Population Density) t-1  0.274 − 0.375    
(0.567) (0.302)  
Months in Office 0.0540* 0.0106 0.00240 0.0528*  
(0.0277) (0.0255) (0.0135) (0.0275) 
Months in Office2 − 0.000626 0.000214 − 0.000105 − 0.000526  
(0.000660) (0.000653) (0.000278) (0.000661) 
Months in Office3 0.00000136 − 0.00000286 0.000000424 0.000000691  
(0.00000388) (0.00000423) (0.00000160) (0.00000382) 
Constant − 1.708 1.754 1.939 − 7.812*  
(3.494) (3.396) (2.104) (4.510)  
Ath ρ    − 0.273     
(0.208) 
ln σ    − 1.753***     
(0.0639) 
Observations 159 146 277 144 
Clusters 83 75 127 75 
Log-Likelihood − 87.79 − 86.88 − 174.5 − 29.63 
Notes: Discrete duration models with a probit link where the dependent variable is Leader Failure. Unit of analysis is country-leader-year. Model 4 uses an instrumental 
variable probit link model. Wald test for a null of no endogeneity in Model 4: (Ath ρ = 0) with χ2(1) = 1.72 and p-value of 0.1895. Significance levels: ***p < 0.01, **p 
< 0.05, *p < 0.1. 
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Table A1 (continued ) 
Variable Leader Failure (2nd Stage) Private Mileage Ratio (1st stage) 
Months in Office 0.048 0.003  
(0.03) (0.00) 
Months in Office2 − 0.000 − 0.000*  
(0.00) (0.00) 
Months in Office3 0.000 0.000  
(0.00) (0.00) 
Constant − 9.901* − 3.100***  
(5.26) (0.49)  
Ath ρ − 0.477   
(0.31)  
ln σ − 1.77***   
(0.10)  
Observations 125  
Clusters 63  
Log-Likelihood − 20.84  
Notes: First and second stage of instrumental variable probit link model. Dependent variable is Leader Failure. Unit 
of analysis is country-leader-year. Wald test for a null of no endogeneity: (Ath ρ = 0) with χ2(1) = 2.34 and p-value 
of 0.1258. Significance levels: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1 Standard errors in parentheses.  
Table A2 
First and second stage results for model 4 of Table 3.  
Variable Leader Failure (2nd Stage) Private Mileage Ratio (1st stage) 
Private Mileage Ratio 2.129**   
(0.836)  
Passenger Cars  0.000260***   
(0.0000422) 
Δ(Expenditure pc)  0.171 − 0.339***  
(0.438) (0.114) 
ln (Rail Sq Mile) 0.364 0.133  
(0.452) (0.0926) 
ln (Conflict) 0.258*** − 0.00105  
(0.0843) (0.00739) 
ln (Population Density) 0.0604 − 0.411***  
(0.616) (0.110) 
Months in Office 0.0528* 0.00253  
(0.0275) (0.00399) 
Months in Office2 − 0.000526 − 0.0000797  
(0.000661) (0.0000761) 
Months in Office3 0.000000691 0.000000312  
(0.00000382) (0.000000360) 
Constant − 7.812* 5.387***  
(4.510) (0.735)  
Ath ρ − 0.273   
(0.208)  
ln σ − 1.753***   
(0.0639)  
Observations 144  
Clusters 75  
Log-Likelihood − 29.63  
Notes: First and second stage of instrumental variable probit link model. Dependent variable is Leader Failure. Unit 
of analysis is country-leader-year. Wald test for a null of no endogeneity: (Ath ρ = 0) with χ2(1) = 1.72 and p-value 
of 0.1895. Significance levels: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1 Standard errors in parentheses.  
Table A.3 
Descriptive statistics (based on Model 1 in Table 3)  
Variable Obs Mean SD Min Max 
Leader Failure 159 0.40 0.49 0 1 
Months in office 159 23.08 26.37 1 141 
Private Mileage Ratio 159 0.24 0.32 0 0.78 
Austria 36 0.11 0.10 0 0.32 
Belgium 59 0.02 0.03 0 0.06 
France 40 0.77 0.02 0.71 0.78 
Germany 22 0.07 0.01 0.03 0.08 
Germany FR 2 0.16 0.00 0.16 0.17 
ln (GDP per capita) 159 8.84 0.57 7.87 9.95 
ln (Rail Mileage) 159 7.51 0.43 7.11 8.66 
ln (Conflict) 159 5.84 2.87 0 9.87 
ln (Population density) 159 8.20 0.59 7.53 9.01 
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Table A.4 
Alternative proxy robustness test for Model 1 of 
Table 2  
Variable Model 1 
Private Mileage Ratio 0.913*  
(0.470) 
ln (Expenditure pc) 0.0837  
(0.127) 
ln (Rail Sq Mile) 0.243  
(0.302) 
ln (Conflict) 0.297***  
(0.0820) 
ln (Population Density) − 0.346  
(0.390) 
Months in Office 0.0466  
(0.0319) 
Months in Office2 − 0.000457  
(0.000746) 
Months in Office3 1.19e− 07  
(4.44e− 06) 




Log-Likelihood − 70.52 
Notes: Discrete duration models with a probit link 
where the dependent variable is Leader Failure. Unit of 
analysis is country-leader-year. Model 1 uses the 
logarithm of government expenditure per capita. 
Significance levels: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.  
Table A.5 
Alternative proxy robustness test for Model 4 of Table 2  
Variable Leader Failure (2nd Stage) Private Mileage Ratio (1st stage) 
Private Mileage Ratio 2.140**   
(1.022)  
Passenger Cars  0.000200***   
(3.86e− 05) 
ln (Expenditure pc) 0.110 − 0.0970***  
(0.135) (0.0350) 
ln (Rail Sq Mile) 0.341 0.252***  
(0.303) (0.0667) 
ln (Conflict) 0.267*** 0.00809  
(0.0872) (0.00846) 
ln (Population Density) 0.0424 − 0.504***  
(0.588) (0.0801) 
Months in Office 0.0495 0.00648*  
(0.0303) (0.00372) 
Months in Office2 − 0.000459 − 0.000181***  
(0.000688) (7.00e− 05) 
Months in Office3 3.06e− 07 8.84e− 07***  
(3.84e− 06) (3.07e− 07) 
Constant − 7.167* 3.276***  
(4.327) (0.405)  
Ath ρ − 0.295   
(0.241)  
ln σ − 1.811***   
(0.0937)  
Observations 128  
Clusters 65  
Log-Likelihood − 17.88  
Notes: First and second stage of instrumental variable probit link model. Dependent variable is Leader Failure. Unit 
of analysis is country-leader-year. Wald test for a null of no endogeneity: (Ath ρ = 0) with χ2(1) = 1.50 and p-value 
of 0.22. Significance levels: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1 Standard errors in parentheses. 
A. Quiroz Flores and K. Pfaff                                                                                                                                                                                                                
Research in Transportation Economics xxx (xxxx) xxx
10
References 
Adam, A., Delis, M. D., & Kammas, P. (2011). Are democratic governments more 
efficient? European Journal of Political Economy, 27(1), 75–86. https://doi.org/ 
10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2010.04.004 
Amaral, M. (2008). Public vs private management of public utilities – the case of urban 
public transport in Europe. Research in Transportation Economics, 22(1), 85–90. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.retrec.2008.05.021 
Andreoni, J., & Bergstrom, T. (1996). Do government subsidies increase the private 
supply of public goods? Public Choice, 88(3/4), 295–308. 
Aydin, G., & Dzhaleva-Chonkova, A. (2013). Discussions on rail in urban areas and rail 
history. Research in Transportation Economics, 41(1), 84–88. 
Bagnoli, M., & Lipman, B. L. (1992). Private provision of public goods can Be efficient. 
Public Choice, 74(1), 59–78. 
Baiocchi, M., Cheng, J., & Small, D. S. (2014). Instrumental variable methods for causal 
inference. Statistics in Medicine, 33(13), 2297–2340. 
Banks, A. S., & Wilson, K. A. (2016). Cross-national time-series data archive. Jerusalem, 
Israel: Databanks International.  
Bausch, A. (2014). An experimental test of selectorate theory. International Interactions, 
40(4), 533–553. 
Beck, N., Katz, J. N., & Tucker, R. (1998). Taking time seriously: Time-series cross- 
section analysis with a binary dependent variable. American Journal of Political 
Science, 42(4), 1260–1288. 
Bell, C. (2011). Buying support and buying time: The effect of regime consolidation on 
public goods provision. International Studies Quarterly, 55(3), 625–646. 
Boardman, A. E., & Aidan, R. V. (1989). Ownership and performance in competitive 
environments: A comparison of the performance of private, mixed, and state-owned 
enterprises. The Journal of Law and Economics, 32, 1–33. 
Bogart, D. (2009). Nationalizations and the development of transport systems: Cross- 
country evidence from railroad networks, 1860–1912. The Journal of Economic 
History, 69(1), 202–237. 
Bogart, D. (2010). A global perspective on railway inefficiency and the rise of state 
ownership,1880-1912. Explorations in Economic History, 47(2), 158–178. https://doi. 
org/10.1016/j.eeh.2009.09.001 
Bolt, J., Inklaar, R., de Jong, H., & van Zanden, J. L. (2018). Maddison Project database. 
“Rebasing ’Maddison’: New income comparisons and the shape of long-run economic 
development.” Maddison Project working paper 10. 
Bortolotti, B., Fantini, M., & Siniscalco, D. (2004). Privatisation around the world: 
Evidence from panel data. Journal of Public Economics, 88(1–2), 305–332. https:// 
doi.org/10.1016/S0047-2727(02)00161-5 
Bougna, E., & Crozet, Y. (2016). Towards a liberalised European rail transport: Analysing 
and modelling the impact of competition on productive efficiency. Research in 
Transportation Economics, 59, 358–367. https://doi.org/10.1016/j. 
retrec.2016.07.014 
Boycko, M., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (1996). A theory of privatization. Economic Journal, 
106(435), 309–319. 
Bueno de Mesquita, B., & Smith, A. (2009). Political survival and endogenous 
institutional change. Comparative Political Studies, 42(2), 167–197. 
Bueno de Mesquita, B., & Smith, A. (2010). Leader survival, revolutions, and the nature 
of government finance. American Journal of Political Science, 54(4), 936–950. 
Bueno de Mesquita, B., Smith, A., Siverson, R. M., & Morrow, J. D. (2003). The logic of 
political survival. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.  
Burstein, Paul (2003). The Impact of Public Opinion on Public Policy: A Review and an 
Agenda. Political Research Quarterly, 56(1), 29–40. https://doi.org/10.1177/ 
106591290305600103 
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